A SAMA CSF incident response tabletop exercise is only useful if it forces people to make the decisions they would face in a real event: who declares an incident, who tells the regulator, what is shut down, and what is restored first. Many exercises walk through a narrative and end with general agreement. This script is different. It uses four scenarios, each run in about fifteen minutes, with timed injects and decision prompts that surface gaps in the plan.
Under the SAMA Cyber Security Framework, the incident management domain expects defined processes, roles, escalation and testing. The script below is designed to test those expectations in practice. Check the exact wording of your obligations against the current SAMA requirements and your own plan before you run it.
Before you start
Allow sixty minutes: ten for setup and four scenarios of about twelve minutes each, with a short close. Prepare the following.
- Invite both technical responders and executives, including legal, communications, compliance and a business owner for critical services.
- Name a facilitator who delivers injects and a scribe who records every decision, owner and time taken.
- Bring the current incident response plan, the escalation matrix and the regulatory notification procedure. Participants must use them, not recall them.
- Agree one rule: decisions are stated aloud with an owner. "We would escalate" is not an answer; "the CISO calls the CEO" is.
Scenario 1: Ransomware with data exfiltration
Inject 1 (minute 0): The security operations team reports encryption on file servers and a ransom note in a shared drive.
Inject 2 (minute 4): Network logs show a large outbound transfer to an unknown host in the previous week.
Inject 3 (minute 8): The attacker posts a sample of customer records and sets a deadline.
Decision prompts:
- Who declares the incident and at what severity? What evidence is enough?
- Which systems are isolated, and who may approve isolating a customer-facing system?
- At what point does exfiltration turn this into a personal data breach, and who decides?
- Who communicates with the regulator, and what must be ready before that call?
- Who owns the ransom question, and is the position already documented?
Recovery trade-off: restore quickly from backups, or preserve affected systems for investigation first? Record who makes that call and whether the plan says so.
Scenario 2: DDoS during peak transaction hours
Inject 1: Payment and mobile channels slow sharply during a peak period.
Inject 2: The upstream provider says mitigation is possible but may block some legitimate traffic.
Inject 3: Customers post complaints publicly and the media asks for comment.
Decision prompts:
- Who decides to accept collateral blocking of legitimate customers?
- At what duration or impact does the event become reportable, and to whom?
- Is there a fallback channel, and who authorises its activation?
- Who approves the first public statement and what does it say?
- Could the DDoS be cover for another intrusion, and who checks?
Recovery trade-off: restore all channels at reduced capacity, or protect the most critical transactions first? Check this against your documented recovery priorities.
Scenario 3: Insider data theft
Inject 1: A data loss alert shows a finance employee copying large volumes of customer files to personal storage.
Inject 2: HR confirms the employee resigned last week.
Inject 3: The employee's manager asks to confront them directly.
Decision prompts:
- Who is permitted to suspend access, and does HR, legal or security hold that authority?
- How is evidence preserved so it holds up later?
- When does the matter move from a security event to a reportable incident?
- Who decides whether law enforcement is involved?
- How is confidentiality kept among the small group who know?
Recovery trade-off: act immediately to cut access and risk alerting the individual before the scope of copying is known, or monitor briefly to establish scope. The plan should state who weighs this.
Scenario 4: Supply-chain compromise
Inject 1: A software provider notifies you of a compromise in an update delivered last month.
Inject 2: Your asset inventory cannot quickly show where the product is deployed.
Inject 3: The provider cannot confirm whether your data was accessed.
Decision prompts:
- Who owns third-party incident contact, and is the contract's notification clause known?
- How fast can you list affected systems, and what do you do if the inventory is incomplete?
- Do you disable the product, accepting business impact, before the provider confirms?
- Who assesses whether data you are responsible for was exposed?
- What obligations apply to you even though the failure occurred at a supplier?
Recovery trade-off: remove the compromised component and lose functionality, or keep it running under heightened monitoring. Capture the risk owner who signs off.
Regulatory notification triggers to test
In every scenario, ask the same questions and record the answers.
- Which regulator or authority must be told, and by whom?
- What is the internal clock for deciding that an incident is notifiable?
- What information must be gathered, and is a template ready?
- Who approves wording, and what if facts are still unknown?
Where personal data is involved, the question of notification under Saudi data-protection requirements should be raised alongside SAMA obligations.
Closing the exercise
Spend the last minutes on three questions: where did we hesitate, where did two people think they owned the same decision, and where did nobody? Convert each answer into an action with an owner and a date. Update the plan, the escalation matrix and the playbooks, then repeat the exercise with different injects.
Turning the script into readiness
A script run once only reveals gaps; closing them requires a plan, playbooks and clear roles. Our Incident Response Readiness & Tabletop Exercises service prepares your organization to respond, covering the incident response plan and playbooks, roles and escalation, regulatory notification, and tabletop exercises for technical teams and executives. The work follows four steps: assess current capability and past incidents, plan roles and playbooks, exercise with technical teams and executives, and improve through lessons learned and plan updates. It is delivered as a project of 4–8 weeks, and the deliverables are an IR plan and policy, a playbook set, a contact and escalation matrix, and an exercise report with improvements. If you want your next SAMA CSF incident response tabletop exercise to produce a concrete improvement list, speak to our team.